WILJ Vol. 40 Nos. 1 & 2 Art. 1

Delivering the judgment of the Board in Rhett Allen Fuller v. The Attorney General of Belize, Lord Phillips observed at the outset that “‘abuse of process’ is not a term that sharply defines the matter to which it relates”. Among other things, it is apt to describe (i) making use of the process of the court in a manner which is improper; (ii) using the process of the court in circumstances where it is improper to do so; or (iii) using the process of the court for an improper motive or purpose. More generally, in Hui Chi-Ming v. R, Lord Lowry said that abuse of process was “...something so unfair and wrong that the court should not allow the prosecutor to proceed with what is in all other respects a regular proceeding”; and, in Attorney-General v. Barker, Lord Bingham CJ observed that abuse of process consists of “using that process for a purpose and in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper use”. But the fact that the term may not always be susceptible to precise definition is not necessarily a vice, since it is now generally accepted that “[t]he power to supervise and protect the processes of the Court must always be given a fair, wide and liberal meaning”.